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The notion of biological function is fraught with difficulties - intrinsically and 
irremediably so, we argue. The physiological practice of functional ascription 
originates from a time when organisms were thought to be designed and remained 
largely unchanged since. In a secularized worldview, this creates a paradox which 
accounts of functions as selected effect attempt to resolve. This attempt, we argue, 
misses its target in physiology and it brings problems of its own. Instead, we propose 
that a better solution to the conundrum of biological functions is to abandon the 
notion altogether, a prospect not only less daunting than it appears, but arguably the 





Biological functions pose a conundrum: they refer to something teleologically-loaded in a context 
that was freed of any purpose. The way we see it, the core philosophical problem is to articulate 
the highly successful practice of functional ascription in physiology (which appears to investigate 
organisms as if they had been engineered) with the theoretical framework of evolutionary biology 
(which is supposed to eliminate any residue of purpose-talking).  
This problem should be contextualized and characterized in light of the widely-shared, tacit 
idea that the notion of function represents (or should represent) a sort of unification of physiology 
and evolutionary biology: physiology uses functions to explain how traits or variations contribute 
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to organismal maintenance and/or capacities, which in turn may perhaps explain why some said 
traits/variations got selected through evolutionary history, which in turn explains why an 
organism's physiology is the way it is. The selected effects account of functions has been purported 
to provide this unification and naturalize the physiological notion of function. However, in this 
article we show that this strategy is fraught with difficulties and a mismatch remains between the 
two, leading to irremediable confusion. Moreover, we also show that selected effect per se is 
problematic. Therefore, function-talk in all its ramifications seems to be misplaced and misleading. 
In the light of these problems, we propose to eliminate the notion of function altogether. 
 The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 1, we describe the various meanings 
functions can have in biology, their relationship, and the problems created by ambiguities between 
them. Rather than being due to conceptual laxity, we argue throughout the paper that these 
difficulties are inherent to biological functions. In Section 2 we propose a reading of the history of 
functions in physiology according to which physiological practice has always treated organisms 
as if they were designed, even if that idea had been forsaken. Attempts to resolve this tension by 
appealing to selected effects remain problematic because of the mismatch between ascriptions. In 
section 3, we furthermore show that attempting to reform functional ascription to conform to 
selected effects might not be a desirable solution. In Section 4 we propose a solution to avoid the 
ambiguities of the problems with function-talk, which is to eliminate the word ‘function’ 
altogether, and we show that in the relevant fields losing the word ‘function’ is not very costly, 
given also the payoffs of avoiding the epistemic problems highlighted in sections 1-3.  
 
1. THE PROBLEM(S) OF BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS  
 
1.1 Four notions of biological function 
Given the debate on the meaning of function, it is worth beginning by distinguishing different 
possible meanings, suspending for a moment judgment as to whether these should be called 
biological functions. Wouters (2003) identifies four main notions which, although not necessarily 
exhaustive, capture the most important and interesting connotations of function-talk in biology: 
  
1 Biological activity, namely “what an organism, part, organ or substance by itself does 
or is capable of doing” (Wouters 2003, p 636). This notion is very broad and, if used 
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without care, can lead to spurious or problematic functional ascriptions, such that a 
function of the heart is to make noise. 
2 Biological role (BR), also called causal role, describes “how a certain item or activity 
contributes to the emergence of a complex capacity of an organism” (Wouters 2003, 
p 638). This notion of function is usually attributed to Cummins’ (1975) analysis in 
terms of causal roles. The difference between this notion and biological activity is 
that a functional analysis requires to establish first an explanandum or a context. Once 
we establish the higher capacity to be explained (e.g. flying, digesting a food product, 
etc.), the analysis is constrained, and ascribing functions is not arbitrary. As Craver 
has argued in the context of selecting which factors are relevant and they should 
appear in a mechanistic explanation, “[w]hich information is relevant varies from 
context to context, but that a given bit of information is relevant in a particular context 
is as objective a fact about the world as any other” (Craver 2006, p 360). Analogously, 
if the activity of the respiratory system is what we want to explain, then the fact that 
the heart emits noise will not count as a function, as it does not contribute in any way 
to respiration. Rather, the function of the heart in this system will be to pump blood, 
thus enabling gas exchange between the lungs and the rest of the body. The heart 
could have other roles in other higher-level capacities. In other words, a functional 
analysis situates an entity in the organization of a system. Nevertheless, even with 
specific contextualizations à la Craver, critics often see such functional ascriptions as 
subjective, because in principle one could define the explanandum arbitrarily. 
Evolution has been proposed to provide an objective framing (see the notion of 
biological advantage, below). 
3 Selected effect (SE), namely “the effect for which a certain trait was selected in the 
past” (Wouters 2003, p 649). This is a historical (or etiological) notion of function, 
meaning that functional analysis is not necessarily aimed at explaining what an item 
does, but rather at explaining why a certain trait is present in the current population, 
or in general the presence of the function-bearer (Wright 1973; Millikan 1989; 
Neander 1991). As such the explanation depends entirely on evolutionary history. 
More precisely, a trait T has a function F iff T’s performing F is the reason why T has 
been selected and maintained in the course of evolution. For instance, moth light in 
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color were predominant before the 19th century in England because they were 
concealed from predators on light-colored trees. However, as soot started to darken 
the trees during the industrial revolution, there was a selective pressure in favor of 
darker-colored moths, and hence the function of the dark color is, under this account, 
to make the moth less visible on darkened trees. 
4 Biological advantage, which is “the biological value (utility) of a certain trait in 
comparison with another” (Wouters 2003, p 643). Here, utility is understood in light 
of what we know of evolution, e.g. as contributions to survival or extended fitness. 
While selected-effect is backward-looking, biological advantage is forward-looking 
(Bigelow and Pargetter 1987; Griffiths 2009) and therefore independent of history. 
For instance, in an environment where pollinators reach predominantly tall plants, 
being a tall plant is a biological advantage irrespective of whether it was selected for 
that reason. 
 
The relationship between these notions should be relatively clear: all selected effects (SE) imply a 
biological advantage at least in ancestors (though not necessarily in present organisms), which in 
turn imply a BR and a biological activity (again at least in ancestors). The historical aspect, 
however, prevents the concepts from standing in a full nesting relationship, as represented in 
Figure 1. 
While one can legitimately debate whether they deserve the label of function, it is fairly 
uncontroversial that the different notions all have their utility. There is a rich tradition of linking 
them to different research questions. Ernst Mayr (1961) famously distinguishes How-questions (in 
the sense ‘how does x operate’) from Why-questions in the context of biology, where the latter can 
further be divided into proximate and ultimate causes of biological phenomena. “It is evident”, 
Mayr writes, “that the functional biologist would be concerned with the analysis of the proximate 
causes, while the evolutionary biologist […] with the analysis of the ultimate causes” (1961, p 
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1503).3 Wouters (2005) notices that this is not uncommon; biologists speak “of functional biology 
and evolutionary biology as two ‘modes’ and ‘ways of doing biology’” (p 130).4 
 
 
          More recently, Marcel Weber (2005) has supported a similar idea, emphasizing the relative 
autonomy of some research questions. He follows Mayr in distinguishing between etiological and 
causal-role types of functional explanation, and he argues that in the former case biologists are 
interested in explaining the presence of the function, while in the latter case the explanation is 
geared towards the elucidation of the specific contribution of the function-bearer (the ‘how’) to a 
system. Next, he also stresses that the ascriptions are established independently of each other. 
Especially in the case of ‘causal role’, this ascription does not have any implication about why that 
particular token is present in the system. Conversely, “elucidating the evolutionary history of some 
                                               
3The interpretation of the two questions is not uncontroversial, and it has for instance been pointed out 
that functional and evolutionary biology cannot be conducted entirely in isolation because the two 
constrain and feedback on each other (Laland et al. 2013). Mayr's point, however, was about the 
distinction between, and respective legitimacy of the questions, rather than about the isolation or 
independence of the endeavours to answer them. 
4Similarly, in his famous analysis of traits in the context of ethology (i.e. behaviors), Niko Tinbergen 
(1963) distinguished four questions all to be answered in order to understand an organism: 1) causation 
(the mechanisms by which organisms do what they do), 2) ontogeny (the development of these 
mechanisms in an organism's lifetime), 3) survival value (i.e. biological advantage), and 4) evolution (the 
evolutionary history of the trait/behavior). 
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system or subsystem is supplementary to analyzing its function; it is not part of it” (2005, p 40). 
Therefore, while SE imply a biological role (at least in ancestors), it serves a different goal. 
 Others have resisted these arguments, in particular the claim that evolutionary components 
have no role in answering ‘how-questions’.  Neander (2018) for instance argued that a teleonomic 
aspect has a role in generalizations: molecular biologists for instance aim at providing a description 
of how types or kinds of complex systems operate. Because this is shaped by multiple variables 
whose number vary across individuals, such description cannot be exhaustive, and “[t]he 
experimental work of biologists often focuses day to day on discovering the causal roles of a few 
features” (p 72). Those ‘few features’ form a ‘normal system’ which, Neander argues, is “one in 
which each part that was selected to do something” (p 72). We therefore take Neander to be arguing 
that that reference to the history of a trait is an integral part of a BR-based functional ascription 
(see also Millikan 1989). Similarly, Garson (2019) argues that to make sense of ‘dysfunction’ one 
would have to refer to a typical contribution, where this typical “is assessed over a chunk of time 
that stretches back into the past” (p 1152). 
Griffiths (2009) provides an interesting take on similar issues. He recognizes, as Weber 
does, that BR are established independently from SE5, which might legitimate the use of different 
words for them. However, he thinks that BR are relevant from an evolutionary perspective, as soon 
as we realize that they can be proxies to establish evolutionary fate of function-bearers: biologists 
can use biological roles (BR) as heuristics to identify likely candidates for biological advantages, 
and vice versa. For instance, one may use cancer evolutionary genomics analyses to identify genes 
more likely to play a role in cancer (Domazet-Loso and Tautz 2010; Ciccarelli 2010). In particular, 
we use an evolutionary analysis in order to identify those entities that are more likely to play a 
biological role in a set of cellular processes – i.e. genes appeared earlier in evolution are involved 
in basic cellular processes, which are more likely to be disrupted in cancer. These heuristics, 
however, do not impinge on the nature of what is actually characterized. 
  
1.2 The problems of ambiguity 
                                               
5 Griffiths (2009) distinguishes selected effects from what he calls a 'causal' notion of function which 
appears to sit somewhere between biological activity and advantage. His argument for the independence 
of the causal notion is simply that SEs are predicated on the existence of a BR-like functional ascription 
in ancestors. 
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One may take the variety of notions related to biological functions and the aforementioned 
considerations on their relative autonomy as implying a sort of pluralism. On this view, there are 
indeed different notions of function and which counts as the most relevant one depends on the 
context. Accordingly, the notion of function would not be problematic. The challenge, however, 
is to make sure that, when using the term ‘function’ with a given meaning in mind, one is not 
misunderstood as using a different meaning, or brought to make inferences that would be enabled 
by another. But ambiguity, we argue, is very difficult to avoid in function-talk. 
Even if one can argue that there is a value in ambiguity6, this is not the case here. There is 
certainly a heuristic value in hypothesizing a SE from a biological advantage, or a biological 
advantage from a biological activity. Similarly, knowing that something has been selected does 
suggest its possible involvement in relevant biomedical phenomena we may seek to understand. 
Yet such heuristics are entirely within reach without using the same word in both contexts. We 
argue that using the same word for two meanings of function can lead to important problems, 
making the pluralistic approach unstable. 
 The first family of problems raised by an ambiguity on functions is well-known: the risk 
of panadaptationism (Gould and Lewontin 1979; Lloyd 2015). The problem of panadaptationism 
arises when a scientist is keen to analyze any trait in terms of ‘just-so stories’ of perfect adaptations. 
In the present context, panadaptationism can be understood as assuming that a biological activity 
or a BR is SE-function. Stated in this way, it is close to Godfrey-Smith’s (2001) characterization 
of ‘empirical adaptationism’. Recently, in the debate on ENCODE’s use of ‘function’ (see 
Germain et al 2014), the ENCODE consortium has been accused of claiming that any instance of 
BR-function is a SE-function, an accusation to which we will return in section 2.3. 
                                               
6There are indeed examples of harmless ambiguity, and even utility of some conceptual vagueness in 
science. Francis Crick is reported to have “observed that if he and James Watson had worried about how to 
define the gene in the 1950s, progress in molecular biology would have stalled” (Robinson 2010). Similarly, 
Evelyn Fox Keller has argued that, while meaning is highly dependent on the context, “the use of language 
too closely tied to particular experimental practices would, by its very specificity, render communication 
across difference experimental contexts effectively impossible.” (Keller 2000, p140) In linguistics, 
Piantadosi and colleagues (2012) argued that ambiguous words can be more efficient when contextual 
information enables to solve the ambiguity. This assumes, however, that disambiguation is not prohibitively 
costly, which we argue is the case in biology. Moreover, far from being isolated, functional and evolutionary 
biology are often integrated, such that context does not resolve ambiguities. 
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 Another - considerably less discussed - family of problems arising from the ambiguity 
comes from assuming that all and only SEs play a BR in phenomena of interest, which can lead to 
ignoring anything that does not have any compelling evidence of selection. We do not claim, here, 
that there is currently a lack of interest in BR beyond selection (indeed historically-agnostic 
biomedicine receives the lion's share of research funding), but that research strategies focused on 
conservation, which we see as the main alternative heuristic to ENCODE-like research 
programmes, have this important limitation. As it has been argued before (Germain et al. 2014), 
there are indeed various reasons to think that many selectively neutral traits or variations among 
humans might play biological roles that are relevant to biomedicine. Among the most important 
reasons are the weakness of natural selection in (especially contemporary) humans (due to a small 
effective size and an increased disconnect between intrinsic features and reproductive success), 
the discrepancy between our lifestyle and environment and those in which we have evolved, and 
finally our increased longevity and concern for age-associated diseases, which fall in the so-called 
‘selection shadow’. Furthermore, variations might have little or no effect in normal conditions, but 
become a cause for concern when accumulating with other alleles and in non-normal conditions 
(e.g. ageing, response to drugs, etc). As Niu and Jiang (2013) write, “[i]n organisms with small 
effective population sizes like humans and mice, the accumulation of neutral and slightly 
deleterious sequences is inevitable” (p 1341). Indeed, many disease-associated variants appear to 
be selectively neutral (Blekhman et al. 2008), and the vast majority of transcription factor binding 
sites appear to be under very weak selective constraint (Vierstra et al. 2020). If a so-called loss-of-
function mutation results in a slightly reduced life expectancy or increased disease risk in old age 
that is selectively neutral7, the gene would not have been said to be functional in the first place by 
an SE account, but a physiologist would still speak of a loss-of-function, because the gene clearly 
is normally contributing to the wellbeing of the organism. 
There are also cases of SE that would not count as functions for physiologists. A classical 
example in the philosophical literature is that of flat feet, which used to exempt men from military 
service (on the erroneous belief that it led to more injuries) and therefore plausibly had a selective 
advantage in the first half of the century. Assuming it did have such an advantage, the SE account 
                                               
7The scenario is not at all artificial: for instance, the recent sequencing or genotyping of a large fraction 
of Iceland’s population identified a throng of (sometimes homozygous) gene knockouts in individuals that 
appear entirely healthy (Sulem et al. 2015), but many could turn out to have an impact for instance in old 
age. 
9 
would ascribe a function to flat feet, whereas both physiology and common intuition would not.8 
Similarly, “alleles underlying blue eyes and blond hair exhibit strong signals of selection, despite 
the fact that no intrinsic fitness advantage exists for these two traits” (Graur 2016, p 502). This is 
plausibly a result of sexual selection, and physiologists would have some reluctance in saying that 
dark-eyed people are dysfunctional. Or that anything in the native american genomes was unfit on 
the ground that their fitness plummeted after the arrival of Europeans. 
 
1.3 Dissolving the ambiguity 
As we have seen, in the life sciences the term function can have, and does have in scientific 
practice, multiple meanings. This ambiguity is not at all productive, but rather creates problems 
and potential for flawed inferences. This leaves us with a number of choices. 
Relying on the logical primacy of BR, Germain et al. (2014) suggested that pluralism could 
be accounted for by using Cummins' analysis of function, and that functional ascriptions should 
only be made relative to a specific high-level capacity to be understood (meaning that there are no 
such things as 'proper functions'). This is not a perfect solution, most importantly because functions 
(whether in SE, or in vernacular language outside of biology) have the connotation of explaining 
the presence of the function-bearer (a point to which we will return in section 4), which is certainly 
not the case for BRs or Cummins’ analysis. Removing such an entrenched connotation from a term 
is no easy task, thus leading us back to risks of panadaptationism. 
The risk of panadaptationism, as well as the apparent arbitrariness of BRs, have led critics 
of ENCODE such as Dan Graur and Ford Doolittle to argue that all functional analysis should be 
framed in evolutionary terms – for instance by using a SE account of functions. They often cite 
Dobzhansky's famous dictum that “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the Light of 
evolution” as a rationale (e.g. Graur et al. 2013). Doolittle et al (2014) for instance write that “we 
do not know what fraction of CR-traits identified are SE functional (...) [i]t seems unnecessarily 
misleading to assume that CR methods alone can establish ‘function’ in a meaningful sense of the 
word” (p 1236), where ‘meaningfulness’ is a synonym of ‘evolutionary meaningfulness’9. 
                                               
8 To clarify, we are not using intuition here as an argument towards one account of function or another, 
but simply to point out that intuitions conflict with accounts of function, and this conflict constitutes one 
of our practical arguments. 
9 In other instances the position is not that neat as to imply that only SE counts as function, but rather that 
inferring “a contribution to fitness (and thus selection) requires an additional and difficult-to-prove 
inference” (Linquist et al 2020, p 1).      
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Presented with counter-intuitive examples, proponents of the SE account typically bite the bullet, 
arguing that in biology, function is simply that. The implication, however, is that the practice of 
functional ascription in physiology is erroneous, which is not trivial given that, as acknowledged 
even by proponents of the SE account, “[t]he main home of the teleological notion of function is 
not evolutionary biology; it is physiological biology.” (Neander 2006, p 592) In section 3, we will 
discuss further problems with the SE account.  
There is, however, a third avenue to solving the function conundrum: dropping function-
talk from biology altogether. To be clear, our position is not against Wouters’ four notions (on 
which there is little ambiguity), but against calling any of them function, and against the use of 
purpose-related language in biology. Such language is associated, both within and outside of 
biology, with conflicting and deeply-entrenched connotations which make a reform of its use 
hopeless. Yet our issue with function is not merely linguistic either, for as we have argued it can 
have detrimental effects on scientific practice and, as we will show, lead to a distorted picture of 
evolution. 
In the next sections, we bolster our case against biological functions by arguing that the 
notion is inextricably linked to design. This is obviously true of vernacular language, but also, as 
we argue in section 2, throughout the history of the discipline. As we argue in section 3, even the 
SE account of functions retains features of an analogy with design which leads to a distorted view 
of organisms and their evolution. Finally, in section 4 we show how neither evolutionary nor 
functional biology would actually suffer from abandoning the language of function - quite the 
contrary. 
 
2. PHYSIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS AND THE NATURALISATION OF TELEOLOGY  
We begin with a very brief genealogy of the notion of biological function, arguing that it 
historically comes from design and that despite the theoretical transformations led by Darwin, the 
practice of functional ascription remained largely unchanged. We suggest that in the context of 
physiology, where it is born, the practice of functional ascription is best understood as 
investigating organisms as if they had been designed (the design analogy). This creates a paradox, 
namely that we refer to something teleologically-loaded in a context that was freed of purpose, 
and SE represents but one post-hoc attempt at resolving this paradox and unifying physiology's 
successful practice of functional ascription with evolution. However, as we have already seen, SE 
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cannot legitimize physiology because their functional ascriptions differ (Amundsen and Lauder 
1994). 
 
2.1 Functional ascription originates from a belief in design and persisted ‘as if’ 
The adaptedness of biological organisms to their environment gives the impression of design, an 
idea that was at the core of biology until Darwin (and in which Darwin himself was involved before 
the Origin of Species), and which has led to considerable advances in biology by asking why 
organisms ‘were designed the way they were’, and ‘what purpose’ a trait had. Mayr (1992) for 
instance notes that “When Harvey was asked what had induced him to think of the circulation of 
blood, he answered, I wondered why there were valves in the veins” (Mayr 1992, p 132). With its 
appeal to Natural selection, the Origin is often viewed either as the demise of this natural theology, 
or as its naturalised justification; in fact Darwin can be said to have reinvented teleology (Lennox 
2010). Sloan (1985) notes that the evolution of Darwin’s thought from earliest notebooks on 
transformism (1837-1839) up to the Origin, seems “to place heavy reliance on the concept of 
nature as a selective and teleological agency endowed with wisdom and foresight” (p 133). This 
teleological language of final causes was however in direct tension with the introduction of 
Malthusian features into his thought, which emphasizes issues of survival rather than harmonious 
teleology. Sloan concludes by saying that 
“we surely see acknowledgement of some kind of purposive character of organisms. At the 
same time, (...) [t]he fitting of form to function, rather than necessary evidence of intelligence 
planning, is more a case of the parallel tracking of one form by the other to an end that seems 
no higher than survival” (p 138) 
 What is striking, despite this major conceptual transformation, is the continuity of 
physiological practice: physiology continued its work largely unimpressed by the theoretical 
squabbles over teleology. Long after natural selection had become a core component of the 
standard view in the life sciences, physiologists continued understanding organisms as if they were 
designed. In his recognized Outline of General Physiology (Heilbrunn 1937), L.V. Heilbrunn 
compares the organism to a “living machine”; today, in the widely-used Textbook of Medical 
Physiology (Guyton and Hall 2000), the “purpose” of various reflexes is explained, mechanisms 
are described as acting “for the purpose of controlling hydrogen ion concentration in the body 
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fluids” (p 48), and a vessel segment is said to “functions as a separate automatic pump” (p 173). 
Similarly, Dan Nicholson notes that  
“Machine analogies and metaphorical references to ‘locks’, ‘keys’, ‘gates’, ‘pumps’, 
‘motors’, and ‘engines’ continue to pervade the technical literature (e.g. Piccolino, 2000; 
Frank, 2011), as does talk of the ‘machinery’ (e.g. Goodsell, 2009) and ‘circuitry’ (e.g. Alon, 
2007) that underlies the cellular organization.” (Nicholson 2019, p 109) 
Functional ascription in physiology has usually been tied to a roughly reductionist enterprise that 
is much in line with Cummins' analysis of functions, and its history could be told as a series of 
descending attempts at explaining some higher capacity through appeal to the action of some parts 
or ‘elementary phenomena’ (Duchesneau 2010), and which then turn out to be less elementary 
than expected. It was for instance thought that the function of organs could themselves be 
explained by fundamental properties of tissues (e.g. Bichat’s sensibility and contractibility) which 
would reduce functional talk to mere physical mechanisms. These were later replaced by the 
features and allegedly irreducible metabolic processes of cells (from Schwann to Pasteur), which 
themselves were later to be explained through macromolecular functions (Morange 2010). The 
early work of Lavoisier (1780), Magendie (1816) and Bernard (1853), for instance, on the 
importance of elementary compounds such as oxygen and nitrogen in biological phenomena such 
as respiration, inspired a program of chemical physiology attempting to reduce physiological 
processes to chemistry, especially visible in the German school (e.g. Justus von Liebig, Carl 
Ludwig, etc. – see in Holmes 1963) and displaying clear advances in the context of nutrition and 
digestion (e.g. Carl Voit’s work). Although the largely European tradition of ‘general physiology’ 
more or less died in the early 20th century to be later reborn in molecular biology with more 
detachment from medicine (Kohler 1982), in retrospect foundational works such as the Krebs 
cycle, Garrod’s “inborn errors of metabolism”, Linus Pauling’s molecular medicine and Beadle 
and Tatum’s “one gene – one enzyme” hypothesis all arguably stand in close continuity with the 
19th century tradition of chemical physiology.10 
                                               
10 Indeed it is not trivial that Beadle and Tatum’s famous work on nutritional deficiencies. As 
Morange (2021) suggested, the concept of specificity (exemplified by Fisher's "lock and key" 
metaphor) can be seen as a historical thread from the late 19th century, linking biochemistry to 
physiology as well as genetics (Olby 1974). The transition from physiological chemistry to 
macromolecular chemistry, especially following Hermann Staudinger's work (see Olby 1974), 
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The language of function permeated this tradition, without necessarily being tied either to 
a theological worldview nor to natural selection. Indeed, teleological thinking before Darwin was 
not all theological (nor even vitalistic): as Timothy Lenoir (2011) has shown, the very important 
school of German teleomechanists simply felt compelled, as good empiricists, to follow Kant into 
accepting organic purposiveness (Naturzwecke) as “an objective fact of experience” (Lenoir p 25), 
but did not postulate an organizing agent, instead remaining largely agnostic as to the basis of this 
organization. Some more epistemic threads of the school argued for the necessity of a teleological 
framework on practical grounds, due to the extreme (irreducible, some would say) complexity of 
biological causation. They did not deny that chemistry was driving biological processes, but argued 
that this approach “will probably require much more time, and completely new methods of 
research will have to be invented before anything satisfactory can be achieved in this area.” 
(Bergmann and Leuckart 1852, cited in Lenoir p 176) This general view was long-lasting, and as 
Lenoir writes “biologists have learned to live with a kind of schizophrenic language” (ix): “In 
effect they seemed to be saying that physiology cannot operate in actual practice without the 
postulation of an intelligent universe, but that all mention of this postulate must be carefully 
excluded from the explanatory framework itself.” (p 236). Even Helmholtz, a fierce opponent of 
the teleomechanist programme, accepted “[t]he wonderful - and, through the growth of science, 
the more and more evident - purposiveness in the structure and function of living beings” 
(Helmholtz 1896, cited in Lenoir p.237), but explained it in Darwinian terms. Natural selection 
was not the reason for teleological concepts in biology, but rather the post-hoc rationalization of 
existing (and successful) practices. 
 
2.2 Disconnect between functions and fitness 
Although natural selection offered an abstract justification for teleology, in practice function 
worked largely in a disconnect from organism fitness. Duchesneau for instance (2010) notes that, 
in Theodor Schwanns’s cell theory, the activities of cells were to be entirely emancipated from 
any idea of causal significance tied to their organism-level integration. This view was by-and-large 
realized, and indeed a good argument can be made as to the value of a relative isolation of (pairs 
                                               
offered a concrete vessel for this specificity (and prime function bearers), eventually leading to 
the enzymatic theory of life. 
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of) organizational layers in understanding biological phenomena (see for instance Morange’s 1997 
analysis of cell biology as intermediate phenomena). According to Morange (2010), it is in the 
1930’s that functions traditionally attributed to organs or cells began to be transferred to 
macromolecules, a program unified with genetics through the one-gene-one-enzyme hypothesis of 
Beadle and Tatum (1941), which ‘justified the idea that any gene (and its product) bears an 
elementary function’. If in the original work in Neurospora the link between molecular function 
and organism fitness was relatively straightforward, it became increasingly abstract and vague as 
the program was extended to more complex pathways and organisms. A further step, developing 
especially in the decades after the 1970’s, was to understand protein function through the 
identification of functional domains, the genetic counterpart of which was to become ENCODE’s 
‘functional element’. As with Schwann’s program, it is important to note that these ‘elementary 
functions’ are only remotely connected to their organismic meaning: that a given protein can 
catalyze a biochemical reaction does suggest that this is important for some broader capacity and 
ultimately for the survival and reproduction of the organism, however this link is not needed for 
biology to characterize and study this activity. A whole biology was to be grounded in the 
characterization of these activities, opening the door for instance to a broad scanning of various 
predicted proteins for so-called ‘functional domains’. Indeed, most of the ‘molecular functions’ 
assigned to gene products in the Gene Ontology are based on mere similarity to proteins with 
known functions, and while this is fairly predictive (e.g. of binding domains, catalytic activities, 
etc), it could hardly be more remote from functions as selected effects. Of course, the interest in 
these activities is not random: biologists investigate enzymatic functions because they expect them 
to be relevant to the organism, but this link was long not at the core of the research programme. It 
would therefore be erroneous to think that ENCODE and the likes departed in an unorthodox 
fashion from an established biological tradition unified around natural selection: it is instead the 
legacy of a different, considerably older tradition, aimed at understanding biological complexity 
through a decomposition into parts whose properties and actions contribute to higher level 
phenomena – in other words, Cummins’ functional analysis. 
2.3 Revisiting the ENCODE controversy 
The ENCODE project, along with a series of similar projects (e.g. Roadmap epigenomics, 
FANTOM, Blueprint epigenomics, etc.), are best seen as representing recent steps in this tradition. 
It is not our aim here to discuss in any detail the ENCODE project or the controversy attached to 
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it (see Germain et al. 2014; Eddy 2012, 2013; Doolittle 2013; Graur et al 2013; Niu and Jiang 
2013; Pennisi 2012; Birney 2012; Brunet and Doolittle 2014; Doolittle and Brunet 2017; Doolittle 
et al 2014). However, since it has become an important locus of discussion about functions in 
biology, we believe it is important, especially in light of the present discussion, to address an 
important misconception regarding it. 
To recall the context, the ENCODE (Encyclopedia of DNA Elements) project was 
launched in 2003 with the objective of characterizing the regulatory elements of the human genome 
(dubbed ‘functional elements’), as well as stimulating the development and standardization of 
genomics technology related to this task. Genes are taken as developmental resources to be 
expressed depending on the cellular context, and this differential regulation is mediated by (non-
coding) regulatory elements in the genome (such as, for instance, the binding sites of transcription 
factors), whose identification and characterization is therefore paramount to biological 
understanding. However, these are much less straightforward to identify from the genome 
sequence than protein-coding regions, and until their mechanisms of action are experimentally 
validated, one can only rely on a variety of signatures for their identification. One such signature 
is sequence conservation: if a given region of the genome is important to organismic functioning, 
then mutations to this region that disrupt this contribution should be deleterious to the organisms 
and be selected against over time, and as a result, the region’s sequence should be constrained 
across evolution. In contrast, a region which plays no relevant role in the organism should, with 
time, accumulate mutations. We therefore see a physiological endeavour, namely the mapping of 
regions that modulate gene expression, integrating knowledge of evolutionary biology to narrow 
down the most important regions (estimates of conservation in the human genome today vary 
within a 3-15% range, with most around 8-9% - see Graur 2016, p. 503). 
However, as we have seen in section 1 and argued before (Germain et al. 2014), there are 
a number of reasons to believe that, especially in our species, non-conserved regions can influence 
gene expression in a way that matters to biomedicine. Moreover, a major limitation of the 
conservation signature is that while it offers extremely good indications that a region is relevant to 
the organism, it offers no clue as to how it might be. ENCODE therefore sought an alternative 
approach, building on the observation that the chromatin of regulatory elements tends to be 
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associated with certain sets of biochemical characteristics.11 The consortium therefore reasoned 
that genome-wide profiling of an array of such characteristics would yield not only a list of putative 
regulatory elements, but their classification into various types, leading to more specific hypotheses 
as to how they can be expected to impact on the regulation of the genome - the biochemical 
signature strategy (Stamatoyannopoulos 2012). 
Reporting in 2012 the application of this strategy to 147 cell types (to various degrees), the 
consortium noted that 80.4% of the genome was found to be covered with at least one potential 
functional element. ENCODE was hailed in mass media with a recurrent theme: that although it 
was long thought that most of the genome is junk DNA (i.e. DNA not benefiting its bearer), thanks 
to ENCODE we now know that most of it is functional.12 Criticisms of ENCODE’s claims by 
leading biologists in several academic articles shortly followed (Eddy 2012, 2013; Doolittle 2013; 
Graur et al 2013; Niu and Jiang 2013). The consortium was accused, among other things13, of 
using the wrong notion of function. i.e. something between BR and biological activity14, instead 
of SE. Another criticism, coming in particular from Doolittle (Doolittle 2013) was that ENCODE 
have wrongly conflated SE and BR, whereby the ‘mere existence’ “of a structure or the occurrence 
of a process or detectable interaction, is taken as adequate evidence for its being under selection” 
(pp 5296-5297).  
An important point to understand is that, as a physiological endeavor of the tradition just 
described, ENCODE was not about junk DNA - an essentially evolutionary concept. Its findings 
hardly have any bearing at all on the question of whether most of DNA is junk (Germain et al. 
                                               
11For example, regions bound by transcription factors show a distinct accessibility profiles, and active 
enhancers show a distinct set of histone modifications (H3K4me1 and H3K27ac), while active 
transcription start sites exhibit other histone modifications (H3K4me3). 
12For instance, USA Today says that ENCODE “have junked the notion of junk DNA”, and the 
Guardian, focusing also on the concept of junk DNA, adds that “this concept will now, with ENCODE’s 
work, be consigned to the history books”. 
13For instance, it was accused of inflating the proportion of the genome deemed functional in various 
technical means (e.g. counting everything transcribed, even though the vast majority is spliced out and to 
our knowledge has no impact whatsoever), and of overselling the results of ENCODE to the public. 
14Graur et al. (2013), despite quoting Cummins (1975), appear to misunderstand his notion and conflate 
biological activity and role (see Germain et al. 2014). ENCODE did however employ a notion of function 
which is halfway between biological activity and role: while not completely unconstrained as the 
biological activity, it is not either strictly related to specific capacities to be analyzed. ENCODE looked at 
a set of biochemical activities that are (more or less strongly) associated with gene regulation, leaving the 




2014), and in fact the expression does not appear even a single time in the publication. It is really 
unfortunate that ENCODE’s PIs did not try right away to carefully shape the press-release of their 
publications in order to avoid misunderstandings around the scope of the project itself, and 
arguably even contributed to the misconstrual of the project as  ‘re-writing evolutionary biology 
textbooks’. What emerged from other ENCODE publications (for instance Kellis et al 2014) aimed 
at de-escalating the controversy is that ‘biochemical activities’ are merely proxies, and that there 
is no necessary connection to functional ascriptions understood in an evolutionary sense. In other 
words, ENCODE ought to be interpreted as a means to understanding the inner workings of an 
organism, i.e. functional decomposition à la Cummins, and while conservation is an important 
good guide to picking out important parts, it is not equivalent to it. We want to stress that this 
succinct reinterpretation of the ENCODE controversy is by no means a defence of ENCODE itself, 
let alone of its usage of functions. Our aim is merely to point out that the entire controversy is 
based on flawed communication and a misunderstanding of the scope of the project. 
Anticipating these observations when reporting the results of the pilot phase in 2007, the 
consortium had indeed noted the discrepancy between regions identified through conservation or 
through the biochemical signature strategy, in particular the “apparent excess” of the latter over 
the former, offering a clear hypothesis: “We believe there is a considerable proportion of neutral 
biochemically active elements that do not confer a selective advantage or disadvantage to the 
organism.” (ENCODE Consortium 2007, p 812) Such a statement makes it clear that ENCODE is 
not conflating BR or activities with selected effects, but rather acknowledging the limits of both 
conservation analysis and natural selection. As with physiological functions, ENCODE’s idea of 
function is not a proxy for selected effects, but simply the product of an activity of functional 
decomposition.  
 
2.4 Functions as design analogy 
As we have seen in section 1, the existence of two traditions with distinct practical usages of the 
term ‘function’ poses a problem of ambiguity which needs to be addressed, and somewhat of a 
challenge to the unity of biology. A firm evolutionary framing, declaring SEs to be the only bona 
fide functions, provides the illusion of a unification but does not solve discrepancies between the 
traditions unless physiologists agreed to reform their practices. In the next section, we will see 
why, even barring the pragmatic difficulties, SEs might bring trouble of their own. But we first 
18 
want to suggest a reading of functional ascription in biology which is rooted to its history, remains 
descriptively accurate, and is arguably more honest. 
A direct appeal to natural selection having of itself ascribed functions, so to speak, is not the 
only approach to naturalizing its inherent teleology. Ernst Mayr, for instance, attempted to do so 
indirectly through an appeal to the goal-directedness of programs (see Mayr 1974, and Nagel 1977 
for a criticism). Born in an era marked by cybernetics, Mayr’s notion of program, although difficult 
to reconcile with contemporary developmental biology, was explicitly continuous with man-made 
machines, the chief example being the goal-directedness of servomechanisms. We suggest that the 
analogy to design, if properly grounded, can also be understood as constituting such an indirect 
approach (if somewhat deflationary) to biological functions. Michael Ruse for instance suggested 
that function talk is appropriate in biology because natural selection produces design-like objects: 
”At the heart of modern evolutionary biology is the metaphor of design, and for this reason 
function-talk is appropriate. [...] Natural selection produces artifact-like features, not by 
chance but because if they were not artifact-like they would not work and serve their 
possessors’ needs.” (Ruse 2004, p 273) 
Under this view, one is justified to say that it is the function of the heart to circulate blood not 
because the heart was selected to this effect (which, although very likely, would be rather difficult 
to show), but because organisms tend, thanks to natural selection, to have parts whose action 
appear directed at contributing to their survival and reproduction, and the heart’s circulating blood 
clearly does this. Others have followed a similar approach (see for instance Matthen 1997), in 
particular Tim Lewens (2004) who analyzed in depth the relationship between organisms and 
designed artifacts. 
 To say that biological functions are metaphorical, or ascribed in analogy to artifact 
functions, is not to dismiss such ascriptions. Indeed, the heuristic value of design metaphors has 
been highlighted for instance by Griffiths (1996), who distinguishes two ways in which “artifact 
thinking” helps biological investigation: 1) reverse-engineering, which seeks to use observed traits 
to infer environmental pressures (and developmental constraints), and 2) adaptive thinking, which 
instead tries to predict traits on the basis of environmental problems. Both have led to important 
discoveries, and are problematic only when they are taken as valid inferences, instead of merely 
useful heuristics. By emphasizing that functions are used in analogy with designed artefacts, we 
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are also emphasizing that it is a simplified, perhaps even distorted and dangerous, and yet 
potentially useful way of talking about biology -- so long as one recognizes it as such. 
 In response to Lewens’ metaphor account, Neander (2006) argued that if biological 
functions are indeed a metaphor to design, then “it is a dead one, for function talk in biology has 
an independent life of its own” (Neander 2006). We instead believe the design analogy to be 
descriptively accurate, with alternative approaches to simply attempt to “cover up” or rationalize 
in a post-hoc and inadequate fashion a practice based on analogy. Indeed, as we will argue in a 
moment, the design metaphor even permeates the SE account of functions, leading to problems 
that are closely tied to the disanalogies between organisms and artifacts. 
To sum up, we have seen that functional ascription in biology originally comes from 
physiology, and that it persisted, and very successfully so, as if organisms had been designed, 
independently of the demise of such an idea. This, we suggested, is because the heuristic of 
considering organisms as analogous to artifacts is useful most of the time. On the other hand, we 
believe that the genealogy of functions helps understand why the concept is so problematic today. 
ENCODE, we argued, is best understood as within this tradition, discussing functionality in a way 
that remains agnostic about the evolution of the function bearer. While this discrepancy between 
SEs and physiological functions became more prominent in genomics, where the distance to the 
phenotype leads to a reduced overlap between the two ascriptions, the discrepancy has been there 
all along the history of physiology. Rather than trying to dissolve it by pretending SEs to ground 
physiological ascriptions, we might as well acknowledge the whole idea of biological teleology to 
be a metaphor, i.e. a (perhaps evolutionarily warranted) heuristic, a powerful explanatory 
simplification, but not an ontological feature of biology. To be clear, we do not mean that 
ENCODE's usage of functions was right or wrong: it was a fruitful heuristic, which however 
becomes dangerous when we forget that it is just that. There is nothing wrong with metaphors - 
they are productive tools - so long as one does not mistake them for something real. 
3. THE DANGERS OF SELECTED EFFECTS 
Given the problems related to ambiguity with respect to biological functions (section 1) and the 
observation that functional ascriptions originate from a physiological practice impregnated from 
ideas of design (section 2), a natural conclusion is to want to reform functional ascription. Because 
they are both firmly grounded in evolutionary theory and are likely to overlap with a considerable 
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proportion of physiological functions, SEs appear as a natural candidate for a new, reformed 
understanding of biological function. We have already hinted at some problems of this approach, 
such as the fact that its functional ascriptions depart (both by inclusions and exclusions) from 
physiological ascriptions, to which SE proponents could answer by saying that physiology was 
wrong and needs to move it, or use different words. In this section, we want to go deeper into the 
SE account and show why, beyond the arguments already raised, a SE monism might not be such 
a desirable thing. Not only SE functions fall short of what they promise, but furthermore these 
shortcomings are mostly because, we argue, the account remains within an unacknowledged 
analogy to design. 
The advantages typically touted of the SE account is that it is 1) objective (in the sense of 
independent of our question/interest), 2) explanatory (it explains the presence of the trait, just like 
we take it to do in designed artifacts), 3) normative (giving a more or less clear notion of 
dysfunction) and 4) non-accidental (thereby fulfilling some idea of teleology). We believe many 
of these to be in fact problematic, but want to concentrate especially one aspect, namely the 
pretense that selected effects explain the presence of the trait15, which we believe to be simplistic 
and to promote a distorted view of biology. 
 
3.1 To what extent do SE explain traits? 
The intuitive idea is that SE are explanatory is best captured by Wright’s account as “the fact that 
when we say ‘A in order that B’ the relationship between A and B plays a role in bringing about 
A” (Wright 1996, p 21). In the biological context, the rationale is often expressed as follows: if the 
organism’s ancestors hadn’t had the trait, their progeny would have been unlikely to survive. That 
is, however, an extremely simplistic view, and the first problem it encounters is that of functional 
equivalents, raised long ago by Nagel: the function of a trait fails to explain why this solution arose 
rather than another. But even this presupposes that traits are solutions to selective pressures 
conceived as design pre-existing problems, in close analogy to designed artifacts. This assumption 
                                               
15This is emphasized by the prominent evolutionary biologist and critic of ENCODE’s use of function 
Dan Graur, who for instance writes that the function “explains the origin, the cause (etiology), and the 
subsequent evolution of the trait” (Graur 2016, p 492), and that “distinguishing what a genomic element 





was famously criticized by Lewontin and colleagues (1984, 1985), who argued that rather than 
adapting to pre-defined problems, organisms both choose and shape their environment. This is 
critical because it invalidates the claim that if the organism’s ancestors did not have the trait, their 
progeny would not have survived – indeed, in many examples of speciation both organisms with 
and without a distinguishing trait have survived, but one has, perhaps enabled by a trait, colonized 
a new niche. 
 There are also other plausible explanations, as Gould and Lewontin famously showed, such 
as developmental constraints, which might play a much bigger role than adaptationism leads us to 
believe. Explaining traits from SE privileges one (very insufficient) part of the explanation over 
many others, such as which variants arose, drift, etc., when it is unclear why one should privilege 
one cause over another. The reason we think natural selection is so explanatory is the cumulative 
effect, namely that each variation leads to increased chances of survival, making a very unlikely 
series of variations considerably more likely (See Neander 1995; Godfrey-Smith 1999; Godfrey-
Smith 2009; Germain 2012). But if functional attribution depended on the explanatory role of 
natural selection, then this means that traits that arose as a one-off change would not be functional, 
which is clearly not in accordance with biological practice – even in evolutionary biology. 
 Additionally, as environments change, so do the ways a trait contributes to fitness. The SE 
account is therefore faced with three choices: i) if the function of the trait is the “first” one, or the 
union of all contributions to fitness it has made in its evolutionary history, then a trait might have 
a function that it never performs anymore; ii) if the function is the most recent one, or the one with 
respect to which it is still selectively constrained (Neander 2006), then it fails to explain the trait, 
because the trait would have been entirely different had there not been a previous selection 
pressure; iii) if the function is relative to a specific time period, then some functions are lost, and 
the present trait is not explained by the present function.           
 Millikan's position presented itself as ‘historical’, but we argue that it was not historical 
enough (see also Griffiths 1996). SE accounts mislead us into thinking that intuitions we attach to 
design and (vernacular) functions are largely warranted in the case of biological organisms. It leads 
us to underestimate the historical contingency of evolution, the role of constraints and accidents, 
and the interconnectedness of traits. It privileges a perspective (certain causal factors above other, 
certain levels of selection), which would in itself be unproblematic were it not to pretend to some 
absoluteness, claiming that “proper” functions are such independently of the questions we ask.  
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 In order to solve these issues, Linquist et al (2020) distinguish origin functions (resulting 
from positive selection) from maintenance functions (resulting from purifying selection). Origin 
functions are always adaptations, while maintenance functions can affect adaptedness (e.g. their 
deletions cause a decrease in fitness) but do not imply any positive selection. In other words, we 
can surely infer purifying selection from conservation of sequences, but this tells us nothing about 
why or how the traits arose. The same applies to the dependencies produced by constructive neutral 
evolution, so that Linquist et al can sense of the historical contingency of evolution without 
necessarily ascribing positive selection to all seemingly SE-ascriptions, thereby avoiding a kind of 
pan-adaptationism “where all traits at a level above that of neutral or nearly neutral variations in 
nucleotide sequence are assumed to be adaptations which have a ‘function’ create by positive or 
directional selection” (p 4)16. An apparent perk of this account is that both functions partly explain 
the presence of the trait. However, we think this proposal does not solve the core problems. First, 
setting aside the fact that the distinction between positive and purifying selection is often very 
difficult to establish empirically, the origin/maintenance distinction and its mapping onto 
positive/purifying selection is too simplistic. A trait or genomic region can have, over time, more 
than two ways in which it contributed to fitness, e.g. can be maintained or positively selected over 
time for different reasons. Secondly, it can be argued that, especially in small effective populations, 
long-term maintenance also requires positive selection to re-establish deleterious variations that 
drifted to fixation (see Brunet, Doolittle and Bielawski 2021). Finally, in cases of traits which have 
lost their origin function, either the trait will be ascribed the lost function (running counter the 
intuition that a trait F-ing is necessary for it to have function F), or it will only be ascribed to 
ancestors, in which case the current function does not, as etiological accounts purports, explain the 
trait. 
 
3.2 Disanalogies in the design metaphor 
                                               
16 We interpret the proposal of the weak etiological monism by Brzovic and Sustar (2020) in a similar 
fashion. Weak etiological monism ascribes functions to traits if they contribute to the current fitness of 
the organism, and to the fitness of the organism’s ancestor, regardless of how exactly they arose. Fitness 
is defined as any contribution to complex causal processes involved in viability, fertility, fecundity, and 
mating ability. In this way, the authors cover even those traits that have been neutrally fixated, but then 
they have been maintained by purifying selection, and no claim of positive selection has to be made. 
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Many of the limitations of the SE account just discussed, and its simplistic claim to explain traits, 
rest on a wrong understanding of organisms as if they were designed artifacts. Indeed, most of the 
disanalogies (noted for instance by Lewens 2004) between artifacts and the products of natural 
selection directly underpin some of the aforementioned limitations of SEs. Here, we will highlight 
the four most critical to our discussion. 
 First, natural selection relies on the existence of variants, whereas intentional selection does 
not (or only in a very abstract sense); this means that the design analogy does not consider the 
causal role, in the origin of a trait, of which variants did or did not arise. There are many examples 
of initially neutral but nonetheless selectively maintained complex traits (e.g. Starr et al. 2018; 
Brunet, Doolittle and Bielawski 2021), and characterizing them solely on the basis of their 
maintenance is losing a fascinating part of their highly contingent history. As we have seen, this 
is one of the problematic suggestions of the adaptationist paradigm of the SE account’s claim to 
explain traits. 
 Second, while in artifacts parts are the primary function-bearers, natural selection acts on 
variants, and as such variants are the paradigmatic function-bearers in SE accounts. Typical 
exemplars of SE-functions, such as tropotaxis being the function of serpents’ forked tongue, 
suggest that the forked tongue was selected versus a non-forked tongue, which is a gross 
oversimplification of evolutionary history. As variants and their (SE-)functions are relative to 
alternatives, it is not so straightforward to go from these functions to the functions of traits – or, 
for that matter, to the functions of DNA regions. 
 Third, although we often speak of selection as a force, fitness is essentially a population-
level phenomenon and cannot be translated into forces acting on individuals (nor token traits). As 
Lewens writes, “Discussions of drift often proceed as though drift is caused by things like lightning 
strikes, while selection is caused by things like predation. There are no grounds for this claim. The 
forces that explain the individual events in drifty series of births, deaths, and reproductions can be 
the same forces that explain selective series of births, deaths, and reproductions.” (p.39; see also 
Walsh et al. 2002; Walsh 2007). The distinction between drift and selection is not in the causes of 
specific births and deaths, but becomes visible only at the level of populations over time periods 
(and, for a gray area that is fairly critical for humans, only in a probabilistic fashion). Instead, the 
distinction is clear in the context of artifacts, where intentions can be appealed to (it is not only 
hammers in general which have been made with the intention to drive nails, but token hammers as 
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well). SE accounts suggest a clear distinction between these effects, which leads to the somewhat 
odd conclusion that of two new variants with the exact same effects increasing in frequency, one 
in the context of a large population and the other of a small one, one has a function and the other 
has not, as it is indistinguishable from the effects of drift. 
 Fourth, Lewens notes that in the design of artifacts, functional specialization precedes the 
process of ‘selection of modifications’, whereas it is the (potential) outcome in natural selection. 
This means that while we have good grounds to expect functional isolation in artifacts (due to the 
way they were designed), we do not for organisms. Indeed, the selective history of traits is not 
independent, because it is whole organisms, rather than traits, that are selected. As a result, we can 
expect considerably more interconnected causal contributions than in artifacts, and much fewer 
cases where a given trait might be given a single more or less autonomous function. As Lewens 
writes, “the illusion of design does provide us with a way of rationalizing organisms and dividing 
them up into specific functional traits, even when in reality we should say that all traits are highly 
multifunctional.” (p 175) Indeed, at the level of genes, contributions to fitness are probably most 
often so indirect, mingled and non-sufficient that the quest for functions (in terms of either selected 
effect or individuated contribution to fitness) might be hopeless. 
 This last point does not apply only to SEs, but to functional decomposition per se, and 
becomes critical in the context of molecular biology where the extent of functional promiscuity 
begins to be recognized (Nobeli et al. 2009). Dan Nicholson (2013, 2014, 2019) has thoroughly 
argued that most of contemporary biology, and in particular cell and molecular biology, have 
considered organisms and cells as machines.17 While such an approach was very useful in the past, 
Nicholson argues that it is now hampering progress in biology, and that we need to recognize that 
“The cell is not a machine, but something altogether different—something more interesting 
yet also more unruly. It is a bounded, self-maintaining, steady-state organization of 
interconnected and interdependent processes; an integrated, dynamically stable, multi-scale 
system of conjugated fluxes collectively displaced from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
(Nicholson 2019, p 123) 
                                               
17“It is almost ‘natural’ for us”, he writes, “to interpret everything in mechanical or engineering terms 
because such interpretations accord well with our experience of the familiar macroscopic physical world 
that we (and our machines) inhabit.” (Nicholson 2019, p 123) 
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 In sum, disanalogies between design and biological evolution are likely to lead us to a 
misunderstanding of selective process, to ignore the role of developmental constraints, the role of 
drift and chance occurrence of certain variations versus others, and finally to “underestimate the 
functional interconnectedness of organic, as opposed to artificial, design.” (Lewens 2004, p 31). 
While adaptive explanations are powerful explanatory devices, when taken to identify ‘proper 
functions’ the SE account reiterates these mistakes through a far too simplistic rendering of 
evolutionary history, which is most visible in its pretension to explain the presence of the traits. 
While more refined etiological accounts can address some of these problems, we contend that it 
cannot address all of them while maintaining the main claims of etiological approaches, for the 
simple reason that these very desiderata come from an erroneous tradition of design. 
 
4 AN ELIMINATIVE PROPOSAL  
Given the difficulties discussed throughout the previous sections (i.e. the problems on the one hand 
of pluralism and ambiguity, and on the other hand of monism in whatever flavour, as well as the 
connotations bound to be attached to functions because of its vernacular usage), our proposal is 
that, in biology, we should get rid of the notion altogether (with a proviso to be specified later). 
This might sound like an extreme and unrealistic proposal, but in fact, despite the prevalence of 
such language in biology, we argue that it could easily do without it.  In this section, we show how 
our proposal would work in the two biological fields where the controversy about function has 
been central - namely evolutionary biology and molecular biology. Although challenging in 
practice, we show that the elimination of the word does not create any substantial challenge in the 
work of either discipline. If we anyway have to reform the language of function, then the additional 
costs of getting rid of it are so low, and the epistemic payoffs (in terms of avoiding problems and 
distortions) so high, that our proposal strikes us as not only sound, but obvious. 
 
4.1 Eliminating functions from evolutionary biology 
In his manual on Molecular and Genome Evolution (Graur 2016), Dan Graur gives some nice 
examples of human variants having recently been under positive selection, and never explicitly 
mentions their ‘function’. One of the cases is the impressive work by Lamason et al. (2005), who 
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discovered that a given light-skinned phenotype in zebrafish was caused by a single nucleotide 
substitution in a gene whose human homolog (SLC24A5) shows evidence of strong positive 
selection in European populations: an allele very rare in African or East Asian populations is 
present in nearly all individuals of European descent. A number of lines of evidence suggest that 
the gene impacts melanogenesis (the production of the melanin pigment) through a regulation of 
calcium exchange (Lamason et al. 2005; Ginger et al. 2008). Pigmentation has a number of effects, 
positive, negative, or neutral for the organism: it affects how we look like, light scatter in the retina, 
and the amount of UV making it through the skin and as a consequence both DNA damage due to 
exposure to the sun and vitamin D synthesis. From this, an educated guess can be made at the 
evolutionary history: since there is less sun at higher latitudes (and diets were poor in vitamin D), 
the positive impact of lower pigmentation on vitamin D synthesis outweighed DNA damage, and 
individuals that carried the allele leading to less pigmentation had a higher fitness, spreading the 
variation. In brief, a mutation in the SLC24A5 gene caused lower pigmentation, and rapidly spread 
in the European population because, most likely, its bearers suffered less from lack of vitamin D 
and consequently tended to have more descendents. 
 This brief summary mentions descriptive and historical facts (such as the prevalence of 
genotypes, environmental pressures, etc.), as well as causal relationships (from genetic to 
phenotypic differences, and from phenotypic differences to fitness differences). It is a very good 
case for adaptation by natural selection. It explains (still very roughly) how a variant influences a 
phenotype, and why it was to be expected that a variant would spread in a given environment. We 
could venture further and say that it shows the function of the SLC24A5 gene, or of the variant 
(already a first major confusion), but what would this further claim bring? Nothing, except 
misleading suggestions, i.e. that this is the function of the gene and that it does nothing else of 
relevance (unlikely); that the gene exists to synthesize vitamin D (plainly wrong); that the variant 
was placed there to enable Europeans to produce vitamin D (ludicrous); that East Asians are 
dysfunctional (dangerously off); etc. Of course, a thoughtful evolutionary biologist will resist these 
suggestions (though would unconsciously certainly be influenced by them), but the less wise will 
fall prey to them -- a risk we run for no benefit whatsoever. 
 
4.2 Eliminating functions from molecular biology 
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Evolutionary biology is not the only context where our eliminative proposal works well. Even the 
so-called ‘molecular biology’, or ‘functional biology’ can – despite the name – do very well 
without the word ‘function’. Given that the word ‘function’ in this broad discipline is used with 
either the concept of ‘biological role’ or of ‘biological advantage’ in mind, we could just simply 
use these concepts, without even mentioning the word ‘function’. 
Much of the literature on mechanistic philosophy, when it refers to molecular biology, 
could contribute to this attempt to eliminate the word ‘function’. The strategies of 
decomposition/localization described by Bechtel and Richardson (2010) can be understood and 
framed in terms of a BR-analysis. We mean that the identification of the locus of control (i.e. where 
the biological phenomenon is supposed to happen) by segmenting a system from the environment, 
the decomposition of this locus into components that may in principle causally contribute to 
producing/maintaining the phenomenon under investigation, and the identification of actual 
entities which are causally relevant, are all relevant to a ‘functional’ ascription procedure in 
Cummins’ sense. The same analysis applies to other mechanistic frameworks; for instance, Craver 
and Darden’s (2013) description of the characterization of phenomena under investigation, 
construction of how-possibly models that have to be turned into how-actually models via modular 
subassembly, forward/backward chaining etc can be interpreted along the line of Cummins’ 
functional analysis. In all these cases, ‘functional ascription’ is the activity of identifying an entity 
and/or a process that is causally relevant to the production of a biological phenomenon – by 
following a strategy a la Cummins, you identify a system to which the entity ascribed a function 
will contribute to. There is no need to use the word ‘function’, because causal role, 
biological/physiological role, causal connectivity, causal organization, mechanistic components 
etc are all terms widely used in the molecular field. 
Finally, many biologists are attached to the concept of “functional validation”, which 
endows a finding with a higher status indicating that it is not merely a description of the properties 
and activities of molecules, but of how these act together to impact physiology. While the same 
idea can be expressed without function-language, it is necessarily less succinct. However, it is 
telling that what constitutes a functional validation very much depends on the scientist: to a 
molecular biologist, showing the causal impact of a molecule on, say, the level of a gene or the 
electrophysiological properties of a cell constitutes such a validation, while for others it implies 
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the observation of a physiological change in a whole organism. It hardly ever translates in fitness, 
and most of the time represents a mere BR which we might benefit in spelling out. 
 
4.3 Function eliminativism 
 Searle (1995) has argued, in a more sociological context, that function-language is 
subjective and eliminable. Recently, Weber (2017) has questioned this claim, particularly on the 
ground of the multiple realizability of functions: in a nutshell, since the same function can be 
realized in very different ways, functions are not eliminable because they group different similar 
contributions, a job that could not be accomplished by their causal (or any other) underpinnings. 
 Our answer to Weber’s objection is twofold. First, we wish to point out that declaring a set 
of features across species as fulfilling the same function is generally used either as explanatory 
simplification or heuristic, for instance when the analogy of function is used to hypothesize 
common descent or selective pressures. As such, however, functions need not be understood as a 
feature of the world (a view which Weber also seems to resist). Second, admitting the scientific 
utility of such grouping, we would argue that the same conceptual work can be achieved without 
function-talk, in particular using Wouters’ four concepts: we can for instance say of analogous 
features that they have similar biological roles or advantages. 
It might be argued that, if scientists are anyway always precise as to which of Wouters' 
four notions they are using, attaching the additional qualificative of 'function' to any of them is 
harmless enough. However, we think that the word function carries with it a heavy load of implicit 
intuitions which could go awry even when authors do their best to be clear, and that nothing is 
truly gained by doing so. There seems to be little ground other than conservatism for insisting on 
the word.18 
Finally, one reviewer expressed the fear that, in abandoning functions, one would 
exclusively focus on the question of 'How does it work', while it is the question 'What is it for?' 
                                               
18 It might be objected that the elimination of functions from biology should lead to its elimination also in 
psychology, i.e. that, when ascribing a function to a hammer, we are not doing something qualitatively 
different than ascribing a function to, say, the behavior of an animal. While arguments could be made for 
intentionality in sentient vs non-sentient creatures, and for the irreducibility of psychological phenomena, 
our stance on this question is more pragmatic. Just like we are convinced that the concept of 'free will', 
though seriously called in question by philosophy and neuroscience, is extremely useful (perhaps 
necessary) to social life, we think that the concepts of function and intention are extremely useful (and 
cost-free) to daily human activities. In contrast, we argue, the same concepts are both unnecessary and 
costly in the biological sciences. 
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which gives the public much of its interest in biology. First, elimination would still mean having 
to answer the historical (rather than ontological) question ‘how did it come to be this way?’, and 
although we agree that there is a funding disequilibrium between the two questions, this has little 
to do with language or the concept of function, and incomparably more with a society obsessed 
with growth and the mastery of nature. Second, if we are right in our analysis, then a good part of 
the interest in ‘What is it for?’ stems from a theological quest for meaning which we think is both 
erroneous and dangerous, and this is not the sort of public support we should be striving for. We 
believe there is also a genuine grandeur in our view of life, with its complexity and contingency, 
and that this is what we should help people recognize. 
In sum, we believe that actual scientific practice already has, in contrast to scientific 
discourse, gotten rid of teleology and replaced it with more precise concepts (such as Wouters’). 
Its usages of function are either superfluous (i.e. purely linguistic or redundant) or heuristic. 




We began from the observation that there are multiple notions of function in biology, and that 
ambiguity between them can lead to important mistakes and misunderstandings. We've further 
argued that the different meanings are difficult to reconcile because selected effects cannot track 
physiological ascriptions, which have their roots in design and are the fruit of functional 
decomposition. Furthermore, we've argued that functions, even when understood as selected 
effects, are far from being exempt from the taint of design and still convey a distorted 
understanding of organisms and evolution by considering organisms as if they were machines. In 
face of these difficulties, we proposed that function-talk should be discarded from biology 
altogether, or if retained then explicitly as a figure of speech. We further      argued that this 
elimination and replacement by more precise notions (such as Wouters’)      would actually amount 
to little change other than a change of language. In light of their history, functions should not 
simply be assumed necessary or fundamental to biology, but should be demonstrated to be or 
dropped. 
Biological functions are a relic of a time when organisms were understood as engineered 
machines. Darwin's tour de force was to use the metaphor of Natural selection as an agent to get 
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rid of the engineer, but we have stuck with the metaphor and the function-talk. Maybe it's time to 
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